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Alaska Wilderness League v. U.S. EPA, 727 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2013) 
 
Maxwell Kirchhoff 
 
I.  ABSTRACT 
In this case, the Ninth Circuit deferred to the EPA’s interpretation of a statute concerning 
whether increment requirements were applicable to a temporary source pollutant.  The court held 
that Shell Offshore, Inc. was not required to analyze the potential impact of an offshore drill 
barge, the Kulluk, under the Clean Air Act.  Additionally, the plaintiffs’ challenge concerning 
the Kulluk's impact on ambient air was defeated pursuant to Resisting Environmental 
Destruction on Indigenous Lands, REDOIL v. EPA. 
II.  INTRODUCTION 
In Alaska Wilderness League1, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
ruled in favor of defendants, the Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) and Shell Offshore, 
Inc. (“Shell”), regarding whether increment requirements were applicable to a temporary source.2 
  The plaintiffs, eight environmental groups (collectively “Alaska Wilderness”), brought suit 
using the interaction between state and federal law under the Clean Air Act (“Act”).  The Act 
makes clear that both federal and state regulators must take responsibility to control and improve 
the nation’s air quality.3  As such, states are required to submit for the EPA’s approval state 
implementation plans (“SIP”) that advance the attainment and maintenance of national ambient 
air quality standards propagated by the EPA.4 
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 Specifically, the Act requires sources, even those operating temporarily in given 
locations, to obtain permits demonstrating compliance with its standards.5  Additional 
preconstruction permitting requirements are also required in clean air areas under the Prevention 
of Significant Deterioration program (“PSD”).6  The PSD imposes increment standards in clean 
air areas by prohibiting total pollution from exceeding certain levels over established baselines in 
given regions.7  Temporary sources may also be subjected to increment standards under the Act’s 
permit requirement and condition statute, 42 U.S.C. § 7661c(e), which allows permitting 
authorities to issue permits for “similar operations at multiple temporary locations .”8 
The circuit court addressed two issues raised by Alaska Wilderness:  (1) whether 
increment requirements were applicable to the Kulluk; and (2) whether the Kulluk was properly 
granted a 500-meter exemption from ambient air standards.9 
III.  FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
In 2011, the EPA issued three permits to Shell which were later consolidated into one 
permitting document (the “Permit”).10  The Permit allowed Shell to “construct operate, and 
conduct ‘pollutant emitting activities’ associated with the Kulluk in the Beaufort Sea off 
Alaska’s North Slope.”11  The EPA released a statement of basis before issuing the Permit, 
which stated the EPA would not require Shell to review the emissions effect on the increment for 
the Kulluk's area of operation.12  The EPA reached this result because their reading of § 7661c(e) 
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demonstrated increment requirements were not applicable to the Kulluk.13  Additionally, the 
Permit reported the EPA’s decision to exempt the Kulluk from ambient air standards.14  The 
exemption was made conditional on the establishment of a U.S. Coast Guard safety zone and 
public access control program to “restrict public access to the waters within 500 meters of the 
Kulluk.”15 
 Alaska Wilderness challenged the increment and ambient air conclusions in the Permit 
before the Environmental Appeals Board (“EAB”), claiming the EPA erred when it applied a 
“source-based” instead of a “geography-based” interpretation of increment standards.16  The 
EPA concluded increment standards applied to temporary sources only if the PSD would apply 
them on a similar stationary source, while Alaska Wilderness maintained increment standards 
applied to all sources any time they are established for a geographic area.17  Next, Alaska 
Wilderness contended the ambient air exception deviated from its agreed upon definition which 
required a physical barrier to exclude the public from accessing the area.18  The EAB rejected 
both challenges, after which Alaska Wilderness filed a timely petition. 
IV.  ANALYSIS 
 Before analyzing Alaska Wilderness’ challenges, the court determined the EAB Decision 
was entitled to Chevron deference.19  Under Chevron, if Congress has spoken to the matter at 
hand, the court and agency must give effect to the intent of Congress.20  If however, the statute is 
silent or ambiguous regarding the matter at hand, the court must determine if the agency’s 
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answer is based on a permissible construction of the statute.21  The court held that Chevron 
deference was appropriate because the EAB decision was a formal adjudication and Congress 
explicitly granted the EPA the authority to promulgate regulations for the Kulluk's operating 
region.22 
 Next, the court found the EPA’s “source-based” interpretation was a reasonable 
interpretation of § 7661c(e).23  The EPA argued increment requirements were applicable as a 
function of geography and whether the PSD would require increment analysis for a specific 
source if it were stationary.24  Under that interpretation, the Kulluk did not trigger the analysis 
requirement, as the PSD imposes it only if the SIP requires it or if the source is a “major emitting 
facility.”25  Because § 7661c(e) was ambiguous in the use of the term “applicable,” the court 
turned to and relied upon an incorporated subchapter, 42 U.S.C. § 7473, to show that while 
permissible increment levels were established by geographic area, the subchapter was silent as to 
how these requirements would apply to minor temporary sources like the Kulluk.26  More 
importantly, the court found two other provisions in the subchapter that imposed increment 
requirements on source rather than geography.27  Therefore, the court found the EPA’s 
interpretation was consistent with congressional design regarding the plain language of § 
7661c(e) and it deferred to the EPA’s reasonable interpretation.28 
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 Lastly, the court held Resisting Envtl. Destruction on Indigenous Lands, REDOIL v. 
EPA29 directly controlled on the issue of the ambient air exception afforded to the Kulluk.30  In 
REDOIL, Shell applied for permits to emit pollutants concerning a drillship, the Discoverer, 
along with an associated fleet.31  When the EPA granted Shell’s permits it approved Shell’s 
request for a 500-meter radius ambient air exception.32  The exception was described in a 1980 
letter from former EPA Administrator Douglas Costle.  The letter provided:  “an exemption from 
ambient air is available only for the atmosphere over land owned or controlled by the source and 
to which public access is precluded by a fence or other physical barriers.”33  The REDOIL court 
reasoned that because the EPA conditioned Shell’s permit and ambient air exception on the 
establishment of a zone that precludes public access, the grant was consistent with the 
regulation.34  Since the EPA granted the same exemption on the same condition in Alaska 
Wilderness League, the court there disregarded Alaska Wilderness’ ambient air contention.35 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 In Alaska Wilderness League, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals relied on Chevron in 
deferring to the EPA's interpretation of a section of the Clean Air Act in considering whether a 
drill barge was subject to increment requirements under the Act.  Further, the court upheld its 
decision in REDOIL to allow ambient air exemptions, even though the EPA did not have 
occasion to consider sources like the Kulluk when Costle’s letter was written. 
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